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Abstract: Intersectional discrimination challenges not only the structure of equality law, but 
also the techniques that lawyers employ in assessing and arguing discrimination cases. 
Client forms, akin to questionnaires, assist lawyers in obtaining a full picture of the 
client’s circumstances and in avoiding the omission of any potential legal remedies. 
Chronologies of events assist lawyers in mapping discriminatory events and establishing 
that the client is within the time limit for submitting a claim to the Employment 
Tribunal. These techniques reflect discrimination law’s defensiveness against 
lived complexities, which in itself restricts possible intersectional analyses. For 
example, through chronologies, each discriminatory event is defined by reference to 
only one ‘ground’. Discrimination law therefore links the passing of time itself to the 
categories it has produced. In this context, Homi Bhabha’s concept of hybridity 
provides a useful way of describing how intersectional subjects relate to their 
categorization through law. It shows how legal subjects simultaneously adopt and 
resist the grounds that lawyers use to describe their experiences. If discrimination law 
is based on enabling legal subjects to speak for themselves, then we should investigate 
these possibilities for resistance. 
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Scientific maps could not be fetishes; fetishes are only for perverts and primitives. 
Scientific people are committed to clarity; they are not fetishists mired in 
error. My gene map is a non-tropic representation of reality, that is, of genes 
themselves. (Haraway, 1997: 137) 
 
 
I would call it ‘disauthentication’ through authenticating yourself as an individual 
and as a representative of a minority community. Becoming a subject – 
gaining subjectivity through the legal process is a process of personal 
disauthentication but generalising about community, stating not only for this 
purpose ‘I am this perfectly ordinary woman’ but so is every other trans 




IT HAS long been recognized that the current structure of equality law in 
the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union and Canada 
cannot readily accommodate claims, and policies, that engage more than 
one ‘ground’ of discrimination (Crenshaw, 1989; Duclos, 1993; Fredman, 
2001; Hannett, 2003). Scholars have highlighted the ways in which groups 
who are defined by reference to more than one characteristic, such as Black 
women, fall between the grounds. For example, Kimberlé Crenshaw’s (1989) 
work on essentialism within US discrimination law highlighted the techniques 
used by US courts to exclude Black women from the ambit of race 
and sex discrimination laws. Crenshaw used the term ‘intersectionality’ to 
describe forms of prejudice and disadvantage that result from complex positionings. 
Intersectionality moves beyond the concept of ‘multiple discrimination’, 
and its reliance on a notion of cumulative inequalities, to describe 
instead new and perhaps unpredictable specificities of experience. To the 
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extent that ‘intersectionality’, as a term, reflects people’s inherently varied 
and unique experiences of inequality, it is more of a flexible and conceptually 
productive term than ‘multiple discrimination’. 
There are a number of different ways in which UK and European Union 
law in effect strangles potential intersectional claims.1 Analysis by Sandra 
Fredman (2001) indicates that divergences in the scope of the protection 
afforded to the different grounds are instrumental in preventing the development 
of an intersectional approach. Intersectional issues cannot be argued if 
one or more of their constituent elements is not currently addressed by legislation. 
For example, any case involving an element of sexual orientation 
discrimination occurring before the UK legislation on this issue came into 
force would not be able to engage sexual orientation as a ground.2 But even 
if it could, sexual orientation discrimination is not proscribed in all spheres 
under UK law. So, unlike the situation with race and ethnicity discrimination, 
which is outlawed in the spheres of employment, social security, housing and 
the provision of goods and services, sexual orientation discrimination is only 
currently outlawed in relation to employment and vocational training. This 
means that people experiencing intersectional discrimination on the grounds 
of ethnicity and sexual orientation in the provision of housing, for example, 
would have to argue their cases on ethnicity alone. 
The law therefore contains structural deficits that prevent an intersectional 
account of inequalities. However, as well as addressing these deficits, it is 
also important to consider how lawyers and clients find themselves implicated 
in essentializing processes that ‘lose’ the complexities of lived experiences. 
3 In this sense I am interested in the broader questions of what 
intersectionality can say about the relationship between clients and the law, 
and what it is about legal practice itself that assists in the organization of 
lived experience into distinct legal categories. My analysis takes place against 
the background of my own experiences in practice, as a Lesbian Caseworker 
at Lesbian and Gay Employment Rights (LAGER).4 One of my aims is to 
consider two theoretical accounts of complex discrimination and complex 
identification as explanations for intersectionality. The result of this analysis 
is a picture of the temporal fluidity of intersectionality, which challenges not 
only the overarching structure of equality law, but also the way in which 
lawyers construct discrimination cases on behalf of their clients. Using 
Donna Haraway’s work on gene fetishism, I develop an account of the way 
in which lawyers use cartographic methods, such as chronologies and further 
and better particulars, to map, and reduce, their clients’ experiences onto 
intelligible legal frameworks. These frameworks require and embed 
processes of categorization that leave clients with a sense that they have been 
‘disauthenticated’ through their interaction with the law. Such a sense of 
‘disauthentication’ goes to the heart of what intersectionality can say about 
how we relate to the law: it represents the way in which we are always more 
than what the law will say about us. To that extent, it finds useful expression 
through Bhabha’s concept of hybridity, and this is examined in the final 
section of the article. 
 
M’S CASE: TEMPORAL ASPECTS OF INTERSECTIONALITY 
 
M is an out lesbian, identified as white British, who has a management 
position in a large organization in the United Kingdom. A couple of weeks 
prior to consulting LAGER for advice, she was subjected to a barrage of 
verbal abuse in public by a colleague, who used phrases that referred to her 
trans status. She attempted to resolve the situation internally, but was effectively 
ignored by her line manager. This was the most recent incident in a 
history of demeaning comments about M’s gender and trans status from 
different senior managers over the past eight years, which she had 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to address without formal action. It also 
happened against the background of ongoing problems with promotion. M 
had applied for a promotion in status within the organization to match both 
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her skills and her pay grade of the past seven years. After a year’s deliberation, 
the promotions committee sent a one-paragraph letter to M, informing 
her that she had been unsuccessful in her application. When she asked 
for reasons, the reply came that the committee did not give reasons for its 
decisions. There was enough documentary evidence to consider taking legal 
action in M’s case on the intersectional grounds of sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation. 
 
M’s identity is clearly intricately bound up with her ethnicity. In the 
aftermath of one of the transphobic harassment incidents, M eventually 
made an internal complaint against C, the colleague concerned. C 
responded by making an internal complaint of racism against her. This indicates 
that ethnicity impacted on dynamics of gender and sexual orientation 
in the way that C and M related to each other, and it should not therefore 
be ignored. However, there is an assumption within discrimination law that 
claims should only deal with the apparently ‘non-privileged’ aspects of a 
claimant’s identity. The real problem with this assumption, as Nitya Duclos 
(1993) has pointed out, is that it ignores the relationships out of which 
discriminatory situations arise: ‘The most fundamental error in current 
antidiscrimination doctrine lies in its location of difference in the individual 
complainant rather than in his or her relationship with others’ (p. 47, 
emphasis in the original). 
Duclos suggests three bases on which discrimination should be assessed: 
(1) how the people involved identify; (2) their relationship; and (3) the social 
context in which they are located (p. 48). It is difficult to structure cases with 
this degree of context from the outset in UK discrimination law. Ethnicity 
did impact on relationships central to M’s case, but as she was not making a 
claim of race discrimination, then any mention of ethnicity would be 
considered as an evidential point only, and as merely supplemental to what 
were considered to be the ‘main’ issues of sex, gender and sexual orientation 
discrimination. 
At this point, I would like to move beyond describing M’s experiences 
merely as ‘intersectional’ discrimination to examining how exactly the 
discriminatory anxieties displayed by M’s colleagues related to each other in 
producing the specific situations and ongoing atmosphere that she encountered. 
Certainly, the overt and non-overt discrimination she experienced in 
the form of comments and freezing out of promotion consisted of complex 
reactions to those features of her identity that went on to structure her claim: 
her trans status, sexual orientation and gender. M’s situation is not unique: 
similar situations were recently described in a discussion paper produced by 
the (Canadian) National Association of Women and the Law: 
 
While transgenderism and sexual orientation cannot be conflated with each 
other, it may well be the case that the expression of fear and hatred against a 
trans person is at once the expression of homophobia, just as it may be of 
sexism. Not uncommon are stereotypical assumptions, for instance, that those 
who are gender variant in appearance or manner, and/or those who don’t 
conform to patriarchally conscripted heterosexual and reproductive roles are 
‘really gay’. (Denike and Renshaw, 2003: 11) 
 
It may well be that the particular way M manifested her gender compounded 
anxieties relating to her sexual orientation and her trans status. M was out to 
many of her colleagues as a lesbian, and out to some colleagues as trans. Some 
comments she experienced could be interpreted as specifically transphobic. 
Other comments betrayed a patronizing attitude to M’s gender: on more than 
one occasion M was referred to as a ‘girl’ in formal situations. M did not 
report any comments specifically relating to her sexual orientation, but this 
is not to say that her sexual orientation was not implicated in the way that 
others perceived her gender. 
The question remains how anxieties around her gender could also signal 
discomfort with M’s trans status and/or sexual orientation. The work of 
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Judith Butler and Sara Ahmed is very useful in this regard. Briefly put, Butler 
views dynamics of oppression as occurring through and against each other, 
so that one ‘type’ of discrimination acts as the background for another. 
Taking it a little further, Ahmed has developed an account of passing through 
and across identity, without inhabiting any one identity at any one time. 
Ahmed’s work may be used, in the reverse sense, to explain how the perceptions 
of M’s colleagues traversed sexualized and gendered tropes in accounting 
for her ‘troubling’ identity. What both theorists have in common is their 
eschewal of ‘multiple oppression’ discourse in favour of an account of 
identity, and perceptions around identity, being constituted by virtue of their 
movement across space and time. 
Butler explained her views on intersectionality in an interview with Vikki 
Bell, published in 1999. Bell asked: ‘You want to distance yourself from the 
idea of “double oppression” and that way of thinking about racism and 
sexism as structures that confer oppression. How then do you see those 
processes interacting or working together?’ (p. 167). As stated above, Butler’s 
response aimed to clarify how unvoiced dynamics can provide the conditions 
through which others are made apparent: 
 
I think I’m less interested in theories of intersectionality, or in versions of 
multiculturalism that try to keep processes of gendering and racing radically 
distinct. I’m much more interested in how one becomes the condition of the 
other, or how one might become the unmarked background for the action of 
the other. (p. 168) 
 
Perhaps a clearer explanation of Butler’s position in this regard can be found 
in her essay ‘Passing, Queering: Nella Larsen’s Psychoanalytic Challenge’, 
published in Bodies That Matter (1993). Butler begins by challenging Luce 
Irigaray’s claim that the question of sexual difference is the question for our 
time. In Butler’s opinion, this claim does not allow for sexual difference to 
be articulated through other vectors of power (p. 167). Drawing on the work 
of Norma Alarcón, she frames her alternative approach as follows: 
 
If, as Norma Alarcón has insisted, women of color are ‘multiply interpellated’, 
called by many names, constituted in and by that multiple calling, then this 
implies that the symbolic domain, the domain of socially instituted norms, is 
composed of racialising norms, and that they exist not merely alongside gender 
norms, but are articulated through one another. (p. 182) 
 
The apparent foregrounding of gender in Butler’s theory, therefore, gives way 
to an attempt to account for the moment at which ‘race’, ‘sexuality’ and 
‘sexual difference’, in her words, ‘cannot be constituted save through the 
other’ (p. 168). Crucially, this focus does not involve a qualitative convergence 
between types of oppression.5 
Sara Ahmed’s work on passing ‘through and across’ identity can be used 
to push this account one step further. According to Ahmed (1999), passing 
through identity not only disrupts apparent boundaries of experience, but it 
also suggests that people who pass experience their identity in a fundamentally 
fluid way: 
 
Passing as the literal act of moving through space (in which there is no moment 
of departure or arrival), can be linked with passing as a set of cultural and 
embodied practices (passing for the other). In the act of passing through a given 
place one does not come to a halt and inhabit that place. Likewise, in the act of 
passing for an-other, or passing through the image of an-other, one does not 
come to inhabit the image in which ‘one’ moves (away from oneself). (p. 94) 
 
Passing provides a lens through which to view constantly changing identities. 
Furthermore, by seeing discrimination as a response that itself passes 
through and across different features of both the person discriminating and 
her object, it is also possible to develop a less static view of intersectionality. 
The change in focus in Ahmed’s account from event to movement challenges 
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any temporal limits to each discriminatory act. A picture emerges in which 
discrimination relating to sexual orientation, for example, can also traverse 
ethnicity and gender. 
Such an analysis could be applied to M’s situation. At one point, X, a 
straight, white male senior colleague told M: ‘it’s your big hands and feet that 
give you away’. The remark can be seen to have frozen complex reactions to 
M’s sex, as her senior perceived it, as well as her gender identity and her sexuality. 
And M took it as such: ‘I remember what I thought about that comment 
was that it was so gross, it offended so many things in one easy go’ (interview 
with M, 2004: 5). 
There was enough acceptance of M’s female gender to display an element 
of sexism in the way her senior treated her during the conversation: the 
gender dynamic was not as it would be between two men. Nevertheless, X 
appeared to implicate himself in the uncovering of the ‘truth’, and in that 
sense he must have considered himself, on some level, to be speaking man to 
man. The interpellation did more than hail M’s gender reassignment. It crystallized 
‘not woman’ with ‘imposter’. It was a complex interpellation, in 
which anxieties around M’s sex and gender, while not being strictly parallel, 
still did not operate as if on separate axes. One linking factor appears to have 
been M’s physique. X’s concern with the perceived size of M’s hands and feet 
displayed a preoccupation with notions of proper, gendered physicality. As 
M put it: ‘As far as the gender thing went – it showed that he thought of 
women as smaller than men. Women were weaker, frailer, smaller. That 
extends into his feelings about himself; he is physically a small man’ (p. 5). 
It is apparent that the interpellation of M as ‘gender reassigned’ did not 
merely coincide with anxieties around M’s gender and sexuality. Rather, those 
anxieties became the condition of the transphobia that was voiced. Using 
Butler’s account, the transphobia itself could not be constituted save through 
sexism and perceptions around M’s sexual orientation. However, with a more 
temporally fluid analysis, it could be said that the dynamics underpinning 
X’s comment passed through sex, gender and sexual orientation. Not only 
that, but those complex forms of discrimination were either explicitly or 
implicitly present in the whole series of events and omissions that M encountered, 
whether it was the failure to promote, or whether it was personal 
comments like the example above. As will be seen later, this interpretation of 
discrimination provides a challenge to the techniques that lawyers use prior 
to, and during, litigation. 
 
ENCOUNTERING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
 
The aim of this section is to consider the extent to which personal interactions 
between lawyer and client can affect the manner in which a case is 
framed. The section focuses on two particular scenarios. First, the personal 
inexperience of the lawyer in a particular type of claim may lead to an 
emphasis on that issue, which does not fit with the client’s own perception. 
And, second, the fact that a client is raising a novel legal point may serve to 
make the client feel that she can only put forward one aspect of her identity 
and her experiences to her lawyers. In both scenarios, interpersonal dynamics 
can potentially impede an intersectional analysis of the client’s situation. 
An example of the first type of scenario happened in M’s case during our 
initial telephone conversation when I asked her whether she was a ‘male to 
female transsexual’. This question led M to be concerned about the extent to 
which her case would be framed by reference to what she feels is the ‘last 
fundamental part’ of her identity: 
 
The first thing I thought was – terminology. She’s not experienced in this area. 
And I said something like, I remember ‘we’d say a trans-woman’. And I 
checked for the response. And you said something along the lines of – oh, of 
course, sorry about that. And I thought – well, she’s willing to learn. She hasn’t 
got that much experience. 
And then there was the other emotional thing – oh God, here we are again, 
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lumped with a political identity that’s not a felt identity. I know some people 
who absolutely identify as trans – ‘trans-tribe’. But this is the last fundamental 
part of my identity. I’ve had to be bloody careful about it – it’s the last thing I 
feel . . . I was thinking, ‘hey ho, here we go’. And I’m working out how far I 
need to support the people I am working with. (Interview with M, 2004: 4) 
 
In this case, M brought herself to LAGER emphasizing no one element of 
her identity and found, at least in one instance, that her political, and not 
‘felt’, identity was coming to the fore through my apparent lack of experience 
in trans issues. That is to say, she experienced a sense of dislocation 
between the person she felt herself to be, and the identity she was required 
to invoke, or explain, to me, as her legal advisor. This sense of dislocation is 
relevant in many different scenarios connected with obtaining legal redress, 
as will become apparent. 
Another way in which some grounds can be emphasized over others is 
when a client brings to her lawyer a novel legal point, such as a ‘new’ type 
of discrimination. In these circumstances, the way that clients frame their 
experiences when talking to lawyers has more than usual influence in the way 
that the case is subsequently argued. As such, clients’ interactions with, and 
expectations of, their lawyers can contribute to processes of ‘fixing’ that may 
already be underway in discrimination cases. For example, M already had 
experience of litigation from a time when the issue of transphobia was relatively 
new to the legal establishment. As a result, the transphobia came to 
define that case, leaving no space for the discussion of inequalities based on 
gender or sexual orientation. This was partly down to M’s own approach to 
her legal advisors. She felt that in order to convince her lawyers and the court 
of the discrimination itself, she had to present an impression of womanhood 
that the lawyers and judges would understand on their own terms: 
 
The way I approach it is to make the simplest case for who you are on their 
terms. Here is an otherwise perfectly ordinary middle-aged woman, highly 
qualified, who you might find yourself at dinner with, who doesn’t get angry 
or stroppy or upset. The person you have to be wears middle-class clothes, has 
her hair cut in a middle-class way – she’s indistinguishable from your wife’s 
friends. She could be a woman solicitor or a woman GP. (p. 1) 
 
Specifically, raising the ‘new’ issue of transphobia meant that she felt unable 
to present herself to her lawyers, and to the court, as anything but trans. In 
this sense, M was careful not to introduce any factors that might complicate 
her identity in the eyes of her legal advisors: 
 
In the [previous] case, it was impossible to go down the route of showing more 
than one aspect of myself – not just because of the law, but also because it was 
not socially acceptable to the people I was working with and the people in 
court. For the lawyers, gender, sex and sexuality were all combined into one – 
into the trans issue. (p. 1) 
 
Therefore, the main focus for M in this context was making her identity as 
simple and as intelligible as possible for those who were representing her. 
This entailed being normal in every way but one, and it led to a slippage 
between how M perceived herself and how she knew she appeared to 
members of the legal profession: 
 
You have to present yourself as one thing. You have to be unremarkable in 
every aspect except one thing. ‘This is an accident of birth. It’s unfair for that 
to be held against her.’ 
I would call it ‘disauthentication’ through authenticating yourself as an individual 
and as a representative of a minority community. Becoming a subject – 
gaining subjectivity through the legal process is a process of personal 
disauthentication but generalising about community, stating not only for this 
purpose ‘I am this perfectly ordinary woman’ but so is every other trans 
woman. (pp. 1–2) 
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M was attempting to manage the difficult task of simultaneously educating 
her legal advisors about the ‘new’ issue of transphobic discrimination in the 
workplace, and therefore conveying aspects of her own experience, while also 
presenting herself in such a way that they would be able to empathize with 
her. Her approach was clearly framed by the constraints of the legal structure, 
which requires adherence to a ‘norm’ before recognizing any discrimination. 
6 Legal action in the previous case made M visible, gave her a voice, 
and gave recognition to her experiences. However, the price for such recognition, 
according to M, was a feeling that the person she was presenting to 
the legal establishment was not ‘her’. 
 
MAPPING: CARTOGRAPHIES OF INEQUALITY 
 
Clients’ and lawyers’ expectations can therefore influence the way that 
discrimination cases are framed. However, the techniques lawyers employ in 
‘mapping’ clients’ lived experience for the purposes of advice and litigation 
have just as much of an effect in categorizing cases as these personal interactions 
and the structure of equality law itself. Even at the initial stage of the 
legal relationship, lawyers locate their clients within a web of possible legal 
scenarios or remedies, within an already constructed legal space. They use 
techniques ranging from particular methods of questioning in initial 
client interviews, to summarizing a client’s legal options with reference to 
determinants such as length of employment or employment status, to arranging 
a client’s experiences into chronological order in preparation for litigation. 
Such processes arguably have the potential to outlive any structural 
changes in the law. And while many of these techniques can be seen as the 
result of what equality law requires in terms of entitlement and evidence, 
they nevertheless contribute to lawyers becoming thoroughly embedded in 
the processes of categorization that close down potentially intersectional 
cases. 
Donna Haraway’s work on gene fetishism provides insight into lawyers’ 
use of categorizing techniques. Here my aim is not to make a direct analogy 
between gene fetishism and legal categorization, but to draw out some similarities 
in both processes. Haraway (1997) uses concepts of mapping, 
modelling and cartography to critique the reification of genes in scientific 
discourse. She focuses on the methods by which scientists imbue genes with 
autotelic significance, so that they appear to be ‘things-in-themselves’ 
(p. 136). Her thesis is that scientists literalize genes and locate them within 
seemingly objective, representational, maps of life (p. 137). The real damage 
of this short-circuited discourse is its ignorance of the messiness of lived 
experiences. As Haraway puts it, gene mapping ‘transmutes material, contingent, 
human and nonhuman liveliness into maps of life itself and then 
mistakes the map and its reified entities for the bumptious, nonliteral world’ 
(p. 135). 
Haraway’s analysis relies on a specifically feminist reinterpretation of 
Freud’s theory of the fetish. As Haraway recalls, the Freudian account 
presents the fetish as a defence for the male child, who sees that his mother 
has no penis and cannot face the possibility of castration. In such circumstances, 
the child has the choice either to become homosexual, by having 
nothing to do with castrated beings (i.e. women), or to develop along Oedipal 
lines, or to come up with a substitute for libidinal satisfaction (p. 144). In 
Haraway’s feminist account, however, women are whole and ‘uncastrated’ 
(p. 145). The implication of this is that the fetish cannot be a defence against 
lack; instead it is a defence against the presence of complexity. For Haraway, 
DNA within scientific discourse is the phallus-substitute for ‘life itself’: 
 
Only half-jokingly, I see the molecular biological fetishist to be enthralled by 
a phallus-substitute, a mere ‘penis’ called the gene, which defends the cowardly 
subject from the too scary sight of the relentless material-semiotic articulations 
of biological reality, not to mention sight of the wider horizons leading to the 
real in technoscience. (p. 146) 
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Haraway’s account of gene fetishism provides a useful way of describing the 
significance of grounds within legal anti-discrimination discourse. If it were 
really the case that clients could present their experiences to the law unmediated 
by potentially problematic interactions with their lawyers and without 
having to submit to coercive processes of categorization, then grounds could 
be interpreted solely as important indicators of social disadvantage. As it is, 
lawyers use various techniques such as information forms, chronologies, and 
further and better particulars to literalize grounds and locate them within 
apparently representational legal maps of life. In this sense, grounds, as they 
are currently deployed through law, have become more of an advance defence 
against the relentlessness of lived complexities than an articulation of social 
and political context. 
The first example of this advance defence in M’s case happened during our 
initial telephone conversation. Throughout the call, I collected information 
for the standard advice sheet, which required me to record M’s name, address, 
occupation and employment status, length of employment, salary, age, 
gender identity, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability status, whether she 
was a member of a trade union, and if so, the name of her representative. The 
purpose of the form was to act as a record of the conversation and to prompt 
the advisor on legal remedies that s/he may otherwise overlook. In this way, 
each option or box had potential legal implications. Responding to the questions 
on the form, M told me that she had over one year’s employment, she 
was female, and that she identified as white British, as a lesbian, and as trans. 
As a result of the first conversation, I was considering M’s legal options to 
include claims for unfair dismissal (if necessary), sex and sexual orientation 
discrimination, and discrimination on the ground of gender reassignment. In 
this way, even from the outset the advice sheet was prompting me to pin M’s 
identity and experiences onto a pre-existing map. 
Understandably, M herself could not identify one sole ‘discriminatory 
ground’ that accounted for the way she had been treated overall. During our 
first face-to-face interview, she told me that she was acutely aware of the way 
that her colleagues were reacting to her status as a woman, a lesbian, and a 
transgender woman, and in her eyes one could not be separated from the 
other. Nor could any of those characteristics be separated from her ethnicity. 
However, M could not see how this could be conveyed to the tribunal. I 
had to proceed within the confines of the law as it stood at that point. The 
only option that appeared to be available was to present the claim to the 
tribunal on all three ‘non-privileged’ grounds and then, if the case were to 
progress, we would consider how best to establish the links between the 
apparently ‘different’ types of discrimination. 
M agreed that I should assist her with formal internal action while submitting 
a claim to the Employment Tribunal in order to protect her position with 
respect to litigation time limits. We submitted M’s claim on the three grounds 
of sex, gender reassignment and sexual orientation. The sex and gender 
reassignment parts of the claim were covered by the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975. At that time, the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 
2003 had not yet come into force. This meant that there was no legislation 
addressing sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace. Our 
argument was that following the Human Rights Act, the definition of ‘sex’ 
in the Sex Discrimination Act should be interpreted to include sexual orientation 
in order to give effect to M’s Convention rights to private and family 
life, freedom of expression, and non-discrimination.7 In their judgment of 
June 2003 in the joined cases of Pearce and MacDonald, the House of Lords 
struck down that argument.8 M’s case had been on hold with the Employment 
Tribunal pending the outcome of the Pearce case. On the basis of the 
House of Lords’ decision, we had no option but to remove the sexual orientation 
aspect of M’s claim. 
As the case proceeded, we faced the exchange of ‘further and better particulars’. 
Requests for further and better particulars are questions that one 
side can send to the other to clarify the legal and factual arguments. The 
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request we received from the respondent’s solicitor, which had been endorsed 
by the tribunal, included a question along the following lines: ‘Please specify 
the ground of discrimination on which the applicant states each of the alleged 
acts took place’. 
Having consulted with the barrister in this case, I responded to the request 
by stating that each of the alleged acts took place on ‘one or more of the 
following grounds: sex, sexual orientation and/or gender reassignment’. We 
did this for two main reasons, both of which were connected with the 
question’s implicit reliance on a legal chronology of events.9 The first reason 
was our attempt to prove a ‘continuing act’ of discrimination. The time limit 
for presenting a discrimination claim to a tribunal is three months from the 
date of the last ‘act’ of discrimination.10 When discrimination has happened 
over a period of time, the last act will be taken to have occurred at the end 
of that period as long as the course of events can be classified as a ‘continuing 
act’.11 The fact that we were attempting to proceed on the basis of more 
than one ground made it potentially more difficult to fulfil such an evidential 
burden. We did not want to risk breaking any chains by specifying the 
‘wrong’ ground at any point. 
The second reason was that we did not want to assist the categorizing 
function by defining each act as a manifestation of only one type of discrimination. 
Legal procedures requiring adherence to deadlines, and bolstered by 
chronologies and statements, produce a picture of discrimination occurring 
through a series of one-dimensional acts. Chronologies inevitably assist the 
categorizing function by requiring each event to be succinctly defined and 
placed on a ladder of experiences. However, in order to be based on only one 
type of discrimination, these acts must also be clearly restricted to an identifiable 
period of time, or specific date (see below). The response to the 
request for further and better particulars in M’s case, for example, might have 
appeared as in Table 1. 
Discrimination law therefore links the passing of time itself to the 
categories it has produced. By contrast, dynamics that pass through sex, 
ethnicity, gender and sexuality, never fully inhabiting one or the other, 
challenge these temporal limits. These intersectional dynamics are irreducible 
to one ‘ground’ and happen at the same time, and/or within indeterminate 
periods of time. They cannot be reproduced in tabular form. 
Due to LAGER’s closure, my involvement on M’s case ended shortly after 
the exchange of further and better particulars, so it is therefore impossible to 
discuss whether an intersectional analysis was developed at a later stage. 
However, even the initial stages provide a good example of the way in which 
structural legal distinctions are reinforced through the proliferation of legal 
techniques. From her very first encounter with LAGER, M’s story was 
reified through my adherence to physical maps, such as the client form, and 
to non-physical maps in terms of legal remedies and the requirement to show 
 
TABLE 1 
Response to the Request for Futher Particulars 
Date    Act     Relevant to which ground of discrimination? 
29 September 1998  M makes first application for promotion   Sex 
5 October 1998   X makes comment about M’s ‘big hands and feet’  Trans status 
3 March 1999   Verbal assault by C in the corridor    Trans status 
2 April 1999   M makes enquiry about progress of application   Sex 
 
 
consistent development of discrimination on each ground through time. I did 
not have the option, in M’s case, or in any other, to avoid categorizing her 
experiences by reference to her legal options or to introduce any element of 
temporal complexity. To that extent, our efforts at the stage of further and 
better particulars to avoid definitively categorizing M’s case were likely to 
prove futile. What this analysis indicates is that legal grounds of discrimination 
are supported by nets of time-limits, evidential burdens, and 
chronologies. This means that changing the overall structure of discrimination 
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law to challenge the divisive deployment of grounds will not be 
enough. Rather, the challenge that intersectionality poses to future reform is 
whether it will be possible to change the cartographic methods that lawyers 




As a description of the fluid movement between and across categories, intersectionality 
clearly challenges definitional and temporal boundaries. The 
purpose of this next section is to consider the extent to which it may be useful 
to theorize intersectionality in terms of hybridity, not least because hybridity 
has been presented by some theorists as a challenge to the essentializing 
tendencies of ‘boundary fetishism’ (Bhabha, 1994: 115; Pieterse, 2001: 220). 
Despite the potential uses of hybridity as an analogous concept to intersectionality, 
however, its real value lies in its ability to explain what legal subjects 
lose when they encounter discrimination law, and how they react to this 
loss.12 More specifically, my argument is that Homi Bhabha’s account of 
hybridity resonates powerfully with the feelings of ‘disauthentication’ that 
M described as she faced the categorizing impulse of both the law and her 
lawyers. In this sense, what hybridity brings to the study of intersectionality 
is an understanding of its political location in relation to legal fetishism. 
Hybrid/intersectional subjects do not fully submit to their narrow representations 
in discrimination law; rather, they retain a sense of themselves as 
more than the sum of their legal parts even as they assume a legally intelligible, 
and one-dimensional identity. 
Hybridity is generally accepted to have conceptual roots in botany and in 
anthropology. In the context of botany, hybridity describes the result of 
mixing between different species of plant. In anthropology, where the focus 
of attention during the 19th and 20th centuries was overridingly with questions 
of racial classification, the use of the term has been more charged. 
‘Hybridity’ along with ‘miscegenation’ and ‘amalgamation’, broadly denoted 
the mixing and merging of types. However, important distinctions between 
the meanings of each word tracked the main concern of 19th-century anthropologists, 
which was to determine whether human beings comprised more 
than one species, and whether the hybrid offspring of two species would be 
fertile (Young, 1995). ‘Miscegenation’ superseded ‘amalgamation’ in describing 
the fusion of races, which implied that different races of people belonged 
to the same species (p. 9). On the other hand, the term ‘hybridity’ implied 
that different races were different species. Such ‘taxonomies of race’, as 
Coombes and Brah (2000) have put it, drove administrative attempts by 
colonial powers in the 19th century to regulate the degree and type of sexual 
interaction between European men and women, on the one hand, and on the 
other, those men and women who were subject to imperial authority, 
whether they were North African, Javanese, or Indonesian, for example (see 
also Stoler, 1997). Scholars working over the past two decades on colonialism, 
racial purity and métissage have traced the violence inflicted as a result 
of these taxonomies (see, for example, Bhabha, 1994; Young, 1995, 2001; 
Stoler, 1997, 2000). 
Robert Young (1995) is explicit about the genealogy of hybridity when he 
states that ‘in reinvoking this concept, we are utilizing the vocabulary of the 
Victorian extreme right as much as the notion of an organic process of the 
grafting of diversity into singularity’ (p. 10). Nevertheless, hybridity has been 
of central importance to more contemporary analyses of identity, ethnicity, 
nation and diaspora emerging in the field of cultural studies (Ahmed, 1999; 
Luke, 2003). For some cultural theorists, it represents a constant process of 
translation and interpenetration between cultures and identities (Anthias, 
2001: 625). For others, it represents more than that; it signifies the inherently 
transgressive potential of the colonial subject in the face of the expression of 
colonial power. 
In this context, Homi Bhabha has developed a theory of hybridity that 
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foregrounds its subversive function in the context of English colonial culture 
in 19th-century India. For Bhabha (1998), hybridity takes place in conditions 
of inequality, during the attempted imposition of culturally hegemonic practices. 
Hybridity happens at the point at which colonial authority fails to fix 
the colonial subject in its gaze. It denotes the equivocal space that the colonial 
subject occupies; a space neither of assimilation nor of collaboration. As 
Bhabha (1994) puts it, hybridity ‘unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic 
demands of colonial power but reimplicates its identifications in strategies 
of subversion that turn the gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye of 
power’ (p. 112). Hybridity is transgressive when it signifies the failure of 
colonial authority to reproduce itself, and when it can be seen to provide an 
opportunity for resistance.13 
Any deployment of hybridity, however, has to take account of its potential 
shortcomings. A line of critique is emerging that hybridity, as an account 
of the interaction of cultures, ethnicities, and languages, is not sufficiently 
rooted in an analysis of power relations, material conditions of inequality, 
and exclusion. In particular, it has been suggested that hybridity is disembodied 
from its potential social and political applications; that it is ‘stuck in 
culture’ (Coombes and Brah, 2000; Anthias, 2001). Pieterse (2001) refers to 
this as the ‘multiculturalism lite’ argument, which is linked with a view of 
the concept’s inauthenticity, or purely aesthetic appeal (p. 220; Coombes and 
Brah, 2000: 2). 
Against the charge that Bhabha’s theory of hybridity lacks historical and 
material grounding, Young (2001) has argued that his work should be read 
in the context of Indian politics and society, as a challenge to the ‘Indocentrism 
of Indian intellectual life’, which was itself the result of British 
imperialism (pp. 350–1). For his part, Pieterse (2001: 221) emphasizes the 
ordinariness of hybridity, its rootedness in history and its potential to change 
our views of historical events. As Floya Anthias (2001: 622) points out, this 
rootedness can also be located in the way in which, logically, hybridity needs 
to retain an account of the ‘old’ part of cultural heritage that exists to merge 
with the ‘new’ to form the new, hybrid whole. However, this in itself raises 
further problems. Hybridity is located between two paradoxes. The first 
paradox is that it is dependent on the assumption of categories and difference 
(p. 625; Pieterse, 2001: 226): no categories, no hybridity. The second 
paradox is that if all cultures are hybrid, then there is no need for the concept. 
One way of negotiating a path through these paradoxes is to recall that 
boundaries do exist, and if they did not exist, then there would be no need 
to question them (Pieterse, 2001: 226). Furthermore, hybridity is a useful 
analytical tool when deployed strategically, not universally, and it does 
appear to be used differently by different writers (Anthias, 2001: 625). 
I would like to argue that hybridity is an extremely productive concept 
when used to explain the way in which legal subjects relate to the coercive 
power of discrimination law. Against the charge that hybridity lacks ‘roots’, 
or social and political applications, my contention is that it provides a unique 
theoretical, and practical, account of what people feel about being intersectional 
subjects interacting with a legal regime that categorizes both them and 
their experiences. In the context of the reification of genes, Haraway (1997) 
speaks of ‘[t]he odd balancing act of belief and knowledge that is diagnostic 
of fetishism’ (p. 145). In a similar manner, when law, or lawyers, perceive the 
complexity of discrimination, their defence is to reify the categories. As 
previously argued, legal categories act as an ‘advance defence’ against the 
messiness of real inequalities. The current structure, and practice, of discrimination 
law therefore balance belief in categories, on the one hand, with 
knowledge of contingencies, on the other. If this is the case, then intersectionality 
represents the return of contingency into categories. 
This return echoes the ambivalent space created in Bhabha’s theory of 
hybridity, where the colonial subject retains an element of the colonial 
culture that is imposed upon her, but also revalues it and thereby achieves a 
unique sort of transgression. And if intersectionality is synonymous with 
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hybridity, then Bhabha’s account explains how intersectionality comes to 
occupy a politically transgressive space in relation to the law. With logic 
reminiscent of Haraway’s belief/knowledge nexus, Bhabha (1994) sees 
hybridity and fetishism occurring at different moments in time: 
There is an important difference between fetishism and hybridity. The fetish 
reacts to the change in the value of the phallus by fixing on an object prior to 
the perception of difference, an object that can metaphorically substitute for its 
presence while registering the difference . . . The hybrid object, on the other 
hand retains the actual semblance of the authoritative symbol but revalues its 
presence by resisting it as the signifier of Entstellung – after the intervention of 
difference. (p. 115, emphasis in the original) 
Applying Bhabha’s concept of hybridity to discrimination law, it could be 
said that intersectionality (as hybridity) signifies the failure of legal authority 
to reproduce itself through categorization. Intersectionality acts at a 
different point in time to the defensive function of legal categorization (in 
this story, fetishism), which occurs prior to the perception of difference. 
Assuming one or more ‘grounds’ of identity within the confines of legal 
discourse, intersectionality approximates the authoritative symbol, but it 
revalues its presence through resistance. 
On a more concrete, personal level, hybridity also describes how intersectional 
legal subjects respond to the categorizing impulse of the law, and 
of lawyers. M’s experiences provide one example of this process, and, as set 
out above, she describes her interaction with law and lawyers in terms of 
‘disauthentication’. When the law needs to see a woman, or a trans-woman, 
M responds strategically with a ‘perfectly ordinary woman’, and a ‘political 
identity that’s not a felt identity’ (Interview with M, 2004: 2, 4). She does not 
recognize as herself this person who has become visible through the legal 
process. She feels dislocated from her legal persona at the very moment that 
she is pushing for recognition. But it is paradoxically through this very dislocation 
that she retains a sense of there being more to herself than meets the 
legal eye. In this way, Bhabha’s concept of hybridity provides a useful 
description of the resistance and re-evaluation strategies that M employs 




It is not sufficient to focus entirely on the structure of equality law when 
considering how to promote intersectional analysis. In addition, lawyers and 
critics need to go one step back and look at all the legal techniques that have 
come about as a result of that structure, and which appear to have taken on 
a life of their own. Many of these techniques restrict possible intersectional 
arguments. For example, the work of Butler and Ahmed can be used to show 
how the way we identify ourselves, and the way we relate to others, traverse 
dynamics of gender, ethnicity, and sexuality without ever inhabiting each 
one. Yet time limits on presenting claims to the tribunal lead to ‘continuing 
act’ arguments, which require lawyers to allocate one ground to each ‘act’ of 
discrimination, for fear of breaking evidential chains. In this way, the proliferation 
of techniques based on a teleological concept of legal time strangles 
temporally fluid intersectional claims. Changing the law without changing 
the techniques will impede the development of a more fluid and responsive 
approach to discrimination. 
The main reason for being so concerned about these techniques is that 
 
they perpetuate the tendency of discrimination law to act as a defence 
against complexities. Defensiveness against messy realities inheres in the 
techniques lawyers use to define and present their cases, but it also leads 
clients to be wary about how they present their ‘new’ experiences to their 
legal advisors. When the law progresses through litigation challenges, one 
ground at a time, the very newness of each ground prevents intersectional 
analysis because, as M puts it, clients have to present themselves as ‘one 
thing’. Discrimination law therefore employs grounds not in the sense that 
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we hope they are being used – as reminders of the structural inequalities that 
mark our world – but instead as defences against the complexities inherent 
in how those structural inequalities are played out at an interpersonal level. 
We need to retain an account of difference or of systemic inequalities. 
However, using grounds as the first port of call in an analysis of workplace 
discrimination immediately triggers time limits, evidential burdens and 
chronologies that should not be underestimated, and which steam-roller any 
nuanced analysis of the relationships involved. 
Intersectionality/hybridity simultaneously approximates and resists the 
authoritative symbol of discrimination law, with its insistence on separate 
grounds. At an individual level, hybridity helps to explain the political 
location of legal subjects in relation to the way that discrimination law represents 
them. It resonates with what M expresses as her sense of ‘disauthentication’ 
through engaging with a process that would ultimately reduce and 
essentialize her identity. When the law employs categories to defend against 
the onslaught of complexity, legal subjects adopt, and resist, those categories. 
If we accept that we have a responsibility as lawyers to bring about a situation 
in which legal subjects can ‘speak’ through the law, then the next challenge 
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1. See Hannett (2003) and Bell and Waddington (2003). 
2. The UK legislation – the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 
2003 – came into force in December 2003. 
3. To this extent, while drawing on a substantive concept of equality, this article 
aims to consider how intersectional discrimination is played out on an interpersonal 
or institutional level, and does not tackle the broader question of how 
to apply an intersectional analysis to indirect discrimination. 
4. LAGER was a small voluntary-sector organization providing legal advice and 
representation to lesbians, gay men and bisexual people on employment issues. 
Like many voluntary sector organizations, LAGER struggled for funding, and 
in April 2004 it closed after 20 years. 
5. Butler has responded to any potential theory of qualitative convergence by 
stating her wariness of theories that attempt to define gender by analogy with 
race, for example, or that compartmentalize them (Bell, 1999: 168). 
6. See, for example, Fredman (1997: 234). 
7. Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights – right to private and family 
life; Article 10 – freedom of expression and Article 14 – non-discrimination. 
8. MacDonald v Advocate General for Scotland, Pearce v Governing Body of 
Mayfield School (2003). 
9. Many practitioners use a chronology in the initial stages of working on a case 
in order to develop a clearer idea about how the events related to each other. 
In this way, chronologies are used as informal tools. However, they are also 
used as the backbone for the initial claim; many originating applications are 
drafted in chronological order. 
10. See, for example, section 76(1) Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
11. See, for example, Hendricks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis (2003) 
and section 76(6)(b) Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
12. I would like to thank Didi Herman for asking me how hybridity can take the 
analysis of intersectionality any further. 
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